MIL-STD-2088B
w/CHANGE 1
profile. When commanded by the aircraft, energy shall be applied to the drive mechanism. The drive mechanism shall place the safety interlock in its ARMED position as a result of either the two separate and distinct events as required by "interrupt removal" or as a single event in accordance with the requirements of "alternative interrupt removal." Control power for the drive mechanism shall be derived from normal aircraft power. The drive mechanism shall be designed to allow the safety interlock to return to its SAFE state when either the intent to release the store is no longer present or the BRU power is removed.
5.1.6.7 Safety interlock override system. If required by the procuring activity, a means shall be provided to override all mechanical and electrical store support latching safety interlocks. This override system shall be utilized if the BRU fails to drive the safety interlock to its ARMED position when commanded as part of a normal store release. The safety interlock override system design shall meet all requirements for emergency jettison regardless of safety interlock status. (NOTE: Emergency jettison action shall require the simultaneous release of all store support latches in less than 0.50 second.) The override of the safety interlock shall simultaneously remove the electrical and mechanical interrupts of the BRU safety interlock mechanism. The operation of the override shall not release the store. The override shall have the capability of remote indication of status and operation. Power for the override system's
operation shall come from a source that is separated from and independently controlled from that of the BRU safety interlock. The override system design and functional requirements shall consider and be compatible with all operational modes and environments consistent with the aircraft mission requirements.
5.1.6.8 Additional release operation interrupts. If any additional release interrupt devices are required, they shall not defeat the functions of the safety interlock mechanism (i.e. the removal of any additional interrupt while the safety interlock is in the ARMED state shall not result in an inadvertent release operation of the BRU). Additional interrupt designs shall consider any single point safety requirements.
5.1.6.9 Frangible attach point mechanical safety. A frangible attach point can be acceptable with any type of pyrotechnic/explosive initiator if the system contains a mechanical safety interlock that would preclude inadvertent weapon release with failure of the pyrotechnic/explosive initiator.
5.1.6.10 Frangible attach point electrical safety. A frangible link without mechanical safety interlock can be acceptable only if the control of arming/firing the initiator follows the criteria of MIL-STD-1901 for rocket motor initiators, and if the explosive/pyrotechnic train meets the in- line material requirements of either MIL-STD-1316 or MIL-STD-1901.
5.1.7 Store release and ejection system. Primary store ejection release shall occur at all aircraft attitudes within the release envelope with all store restraining mechanisms removed simultaneously and the vertical supports driven to the release position by compatible sequencing
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